Chapter 14
Measuring the Theoretical Quantities: What Could and Could Not Be
Measured
14.1 Purpose of this chapter
This chapter tabulates which of the symbols introduced in Part I could actually be measured, and what values they take where they could. Each chapter of Part IV treats a separate domain, so the correspondence with the theoretical quantities is easily scattered. This chapter supplies the index.
Its main purpose is to make explicit what could not be measured. Fewer than half the quantities the framework defines could be connected to real data.
The stage reached differs by quantity (Remark 11.3). The list here is a record of where between stages 1 and 3 of Section 11.2 each one stalled.
14.2 The primitive sets made concrete
| Symbol | Domain | The set realized, and its cardinality |
| family 2 | issuers, purchasers, merchants. 2,034 issuers (829 third-party, 1,205 own-use) |
|
| family 5 | agencies, job seekers, employers. 30,561 establishments, 13,946 with placements |
|
| industry | the population of the corporate statistics: 62 industries 16 capital classes |
|
| family 2 | FY2020–FY2024, |
|
| family 5 | FY2024 alone; the panel covers FY2020–FY2025, |
|
| industry | FY2000–FY2024, |
|
| family 2 | four media of prepaid instruments (paper, magnetic, IC, server) |
|
| all domains | not observed. Only the arrival rate is proxied in Chapter 9 |
|
| all domains | not observed |
Remark 14.1 (Consequence of being unmeasurable). The state space itself cannot be observed. The dependence of or on therefore cannot be verified directly, and every empirical result here concerns quantities marginalized over . The one exception is Chapter 9, where the arrival rate of unforeseen states is proxied by counts of vulnerabilities.
14.3 The observed range of the map
Part II enumerated 28 types; those that could be connected to real data are limited to the following (Table 14.2).
| Type | Instance | Quantities observed |
| 2-4 prepaid | prepaid payment instruments | , , , an upper bound on |
| 5-1 success fee | fee-charging employment placement | per placement, , the extent of |
| 6-1 transaction fee | payment and distribution platforms | the price of |
| 6-4 charging for opportunity | marketplace customer acquisition | the price of |
| 1-3 one-off arrears | trade credit in the corporate statistics |
That is five of the 28 types. Family 3 (renting assets), family 4 (complement recovery) and family 7 (payer separation) were not measured at all.
14.4 Cumulants and the credit position
14.4.1 , and in family 2
Substituting FY2024 values into the definitions of Chapter 2, in millions of yen:
Against (3.2), trillion yen. Being negative, customers extend credit to the issuer. Applying (5.1),
14.4.2 by medium
The same calculation by medium shows a difference of two orders of magnitude.
| Medium | (million yen) | (million yen) | (days) |
| Magnetic | 562,980 | 107,925 | 1,904 |
| Paper | 1,127,149 | 486,732 | 845 |
| Server | 670,552 | 14,331,607 | 17 |
| IC card | 534,645 | 13,224,087 | 15 |
14.4.3 in the corporate statistics
Applying (3.2) to the corporate sector as a whole, FY2024, all industries excluding finance and insurance.
The sign of depends on both size and industry, and the industry effect dominates. In retail, days for firms of 1bn yen and over: the sign reverses.
14.5 Measuring the growth constraint
The of Corollary 5.7 needs four quantities. The measurement proceeds in two stages.
| Object | Quantities used |
Period |
| Long-run trend | and only; the ratio |
FY2000–FY2024 |
| Level | , , , ; itself |
FY2016–FY2024 |
and are not used on the long-run side because depreciation and fixed-asset balances were not obtained back to the 1990s. For , the operating margin is used: the of Chapter 5 is what funds increases in working capital, so a figure net of selling and administrative expenses is closer to the definition.
14.5.1 The corporate sector over time ()
| Fiscal year | (days) | ||
| 2000 | 24.9 | 2.62% | 38.5% |
| 2005 | 24.4 | 3.16% | 47.3% |
| 2009 | 28.0 | 2.01% | 26.2% |
| 2015 | 30.6 | 3.95% | 47.1% |
| 2020 | 35.4 | 3.06% | 31.5% |
| 2024 | 37.2 | 5.01% | 49.2% |
All industries excluding finance and insurance, all sizes. and not included
The trend is shown in Figure 14.1.
Proposition 14.2 ( has not declined). Between FY2000 and FY2024, worsened by 49%, from 24.9 to 37.2 days. But improved by 91%, from 2.62% to 5.01%, so
and the ratio in fact rose. The mean over 25 years is 41.1% with a standard deviation of 7.3 points. Against a mean of 38.0% over the first twelve years, the last thirteen average 44.0%. No declining trend is present.
Remark 14.3 (This proposition is not about itself). The of Corollary 5.7 is . Proposition 14.2 concerns only , which excludes and .
The reason for using in the long time series is given in Table 14.4. The including and is computed for FY2016–FY2024 in Section 14.5.
The proposition is therefore a claim about the trend of a ratio, not about the level of the self-financeable growth rate. If has trended, the path of can differ from that of .
Remark 14.4 (Numerator and denominator must be measured separately). Looking at the deterioration of alone suggests a worsening growth constraint. But Corollary 5.7 is a ratio, and no conclusion follows from a change in the denominator alone. Arguing from without obtaining reaches the opposite of the truth.
What drives the movement of is mainly . The troughs are FY2008–FY2009 (around 26%) and FY2020 (31.5%), both due to falling margins rather than to .
14.5.2 including depreciation and investment
Corollary 5.7 needs, besides , the depreciation rate and investment . As Remark 5.12 states, is not assumed. is estimated as the change in fixed-asset balances plus depreciation. Land is excluded because it is not depreciated.
| (14.7) |
| Size (capital) | (2024) | 9-yr mean | SD | ||||
| 1bn yen and over | 47 | 7.8% | 3.1% | 4.2% | 52.0% | 49.3% | 6.0 |
| 100m – 1bn | 35 | 4.8% | 2.1% | 4.3% | 27.1% | 39.6% | 12.2 |
| 50m – 100m | 30 | 3.9% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 45.8% | 33.0% | 15.2 |
| 20m – 50m | 25 | 3.5% | 2.1% | 1.2% | 64.3% | 35.0% | 17.0 |
| 10m – 20m | 37 | 1.8% | 2.3% | 5.5% | −13.8% | 15.5% | 30.8 |
| Under 10m | 26 | 1.5% | 2.9% | 2.0% | 34.7% | 3.1% | 41.4 |
All industries excluding finance and insurance; in days; SD is the nine-year standard deviation of . Ten years of data (FY2015–FY2024) were obtained, but because the of (14.7) needs the previous year’s fixed-asset balance, can be computed only from FY2016, and the mean and SD are taken over the nine years FY2016–FY2024
Remark 14.5 (Single-year values differ in reliability by size). The nine-year standard deviation of is 0.3 for firms of 1bn yen and over and 2.9 for those under 10m — an order of magnitude apart. Because (14.7) uses changes in balances, retirements and disposals and movement between capital classes contaminate it. Capital changes with equity issuance irrespective of performance, so firms move between classes.
The direction of movement is not constant. The of the under-10m class recorded in 2016 and in 2022, so this is not a one-directional bias. Averaging therefore largely cancels the effect, but single-year values are unreliable for the small classes.
This is why the table reports both single-year and nine-year figures with standard deviations.
Following Remark 14.5, judgments use the nine-year means.
Proposition 14.6 (The constraint on small firms is not ). On nine-year means, for firms under 10m yen of capital is 3.1%, more than an order of magnitude below the 49.3% of firms of 1bn and over. The difference does not come from : the of the small classes (26–37 days) is in fact shorter than that of large firms (47 days).
The cause is the numerator. is 6.7% for firms of 1bn and over and 2.4% for those under 10m; besides a low of 1.5%, an investment burden exceeding contributes.
In the single year, the under-10m class shows a high , but with a standard deviation of 41.4 no meaning should be read into that value.
14.5.3 by industry
| Industry | 9-yr mean | SD | ||||
| Manufacturing | 42 | 5.4% | 2.8% | 4.2% | 34.8% | 5.6 |
| All industries | 37 | 5.0% | 2.5% | 3.5% | 37.7% | 7.5 |
| Wholesale | 33 | 2.2% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 20.9% | 6.9 |
| Construction | 40 | 4.5% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 47.1% | 11.3 |
| Retail | 23 | 2.7% | 1.5% | 1.6% | 29.0% | 12.2 |
| Employment placement and dispatch | 33 | 3.9% | 0.6% | −0.3% | 42.7% | 13.9 |
| Information and communications | 58 | 8.2% | 4.8% | 5.2% | 61.2% | 16.5 |
| Other services | 34 | 5.4% | 3.0% | 5.5% | 47.9% | 32.3 |
| Accommodation | 22 | 6.6% | 3.5% | 6.3% | −204.2% | 872 |
| Food services | 5 | 1.2% | 2.4% | −0.4% | 266.9% | 3334 |
The bottom two industries in Table 14.7 exhibit the divergence of Remark 5.13. The of food services is 5 days, so a one-point movement in the numerator moves by about 73 points. The standard deviation of 3334 is the consequence of that amplification: is not functioning as an indicator.
Remark 14.7 (Two meanings of a short ). In the types of Part II, food services is family 1-1 (immediate exchange) and is a structural property (Corollary 5.17). A short indicates sound liquidity, but it simultaneously makes the ratio meaningless. Corollary 5.7 is useful only for objects whose is some tens of days or more.
14.5.4 The of small firms is decided by directors’ remuneration
Proposition 14.6 showed that is the constraint but not why is low. Decompose the cost structure.
| Size (capital) | Gross margin | SG&A ratio | Personnel ratio | |
| 1bn yen and over | 23.6% | 15.8% | 7.7% | 7.8% |
| 100m – 1bn | 21.5% | 16.8% | 10.3% | 4.8% |
| 50m – 100m | 25.9% | 22.0% | 12.3% | 3.9% |
| 20m – 50m | 26.0% | 22.4% | 15.0% | 3.5% |
| 10m – 20m | 33.8% | 32.0% | 17.7% | 1.8% |
| Under 10m | 46.3% | 44.8% | 22.7% | 1.5% |
All industries excluding finance and insurance, FY2024
Small firms have high gross margins: 46.3% against 23.6% for large firms. Their SG&A ratio, however, is 44.8% against 15.8%. As Remark 2.17 notes, part of that difference may be : at a scale where invoicing and chasing are done by hand, the operating cost of contracts is booked in SG&A. This text does not separate it. The low is therefore not due to a lack of pricing power; the drop occurs at the SG&A stage.
Moving personnel costs back into cost of sales narrows the gap in gross margin from 22.7 points to 7.7 (15.9% against 23.6%). Two-thirds of the gap was a difference of accounting classification. Even after the adjustment, however, the small classes remain higher.
Decomposing personnel costs into directors and employees identifies the cause.
The directors’ share is directors’ remuneration as a fraction of personnel costs
Proposition 14.8 (Directors’ remuneration explains the difference in by size). Directors’ remuneration as a fraction of sales is 0.16% for firms with capital of 1bn yen and over and 8.04% for those under 10m — a fiftyfold difference. The gap in between the largest and smallest classes is 6.3 points, while the gap in directors’ remuneration is 7.88 points, large enough to account for it.
Adding directors’ remuneration back into operating profit removes the monotone ordering.
| Size | After adding remuneration back | |
| 1bn yen and over | 7.8% | 8.0% |
| 20m – 50m | 3.5% | 5.9% |
| Under 10m | 1.5% | 9.5% |
The smallest class becomes the highest. The same holds within industries: is higher for the small classes in 1 of 9 industries as reported, but in 7 after remuneration is added back.
Remark 14.9 (A discrepancy with the definition of ). Chapter 5 defined as what funds increases in working capital. If directors’ remuneration is discretionary, what a small operator can actually use is not operating profit but operating profit plus directors’ remuneration. On that basis the numerator for the under-10m class is not the 2.4% of but 10.4% once remuneration of 8.04% is added. Dividing by days gives 146%, far above the 51.7% of large firms (Section 14.5; nine-year mean 49.3%).
That is, Proposition 14.6’s claim that small firms are constrained by is correct only so long as reported operating profit is taken to be ; with an faithful to the definition, the conclusion reverses.
14.5.5 Comparison with unincorporated businesses
Proposition 14.8 rests on the corporate statistics. Whether the same structure appears in a different statistic, with different size classes, and in a sample including entities without corporate personality, is checked here.
The Basic Survey on Small and Medium Enterprises was used: a sample of about 110,000 firms in which four corporate size classes by headcount and unincorporated businesses appear in the same table. Unincorporated businesses have no line item for directors’ remuneration, so the proprietor’s return to labour remains in operating profit.
Registered implication: the operating margin of unincorporated businesses is close to the corporate small classes’ figure “after adding remuneration back”. The two are substantively the same economic agent and differ only in accounting classification.
| Class | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Mean | SD |
| Corporate, 5 or fewer | 2.7 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 0.7 |
| Corporate, 6–20 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 0.6 |
| Corporate, 21–50 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 0.6 |
| Corporate, 51 and over | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 0.4 |
| Unincorporated | 17.0 | 18.5 | 18.2 | 15.8 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 16.9 | 1.3 |
Operating margin (%), all industries, by fiscal year
The implication is supported. The operating margin of unincorporated businesses is about five times the corporate figure in all six years, with a standard deviation of 1.3. This is not a single-year peculiarity. The corporate figure after adding remuneration back in Section 14.5.4 was 9.5%. The 16.9% of unincorporated businesses exceeds that, but is far closer to it than to the 1.5–3.0% before adding back.
The personnel-cost ratio explains the difference.
| Class | Operating margin | Personnel ratio | Total |
| Corporate, 5 or fewer | 2.5% | 14.7% | 17.2% |
| Corporate, 6–20 | 2.6% | 16.9% | 19.5% |
| Unincorporated | 16.9% | 9.8% | 26.7% |
Six-year means. The personnel ratio is labour cost in cost of sales plus personnel cost in SG&A
Unincorporated businesses have the lowest personnel ratio, because the proprietor’s labour is not booked as a cost. What appears in personnel costs as directors’ remuneration in a company remains in operating profit for an unincorporated business.
Remark 14.10 (The sign reverses during the pandemic). In FY2020 the operating margin fell in every corporate class (2.7% 1.1% for firms of five or fewer). Only unincorporated businesses rose (17.0% 18.5%).
This has the same form as the observation in Remark 14.12. Because the operating profit of an unincorporated business contains the proprietor’s own take, the ratio does not fall when sales fall unless the proprietor reduces that take. If employee wages and outsourcing are cut first, it rises.
That directors’ remuneration in companies moves independently of profit, and that the operating margin of unincorporated businesses rises in a downturn, are two appearances of one and the same phenomenon.
Remark 14.11 (Capital expenditure by unincorporated businesses). The same survey gives for unincorporated businesses: a six-year mean of 1.9% with a standard deviation of 1.0. That is lower and less stable than the 3.1% (SD 0.1) of corporate firms with 51 or more employees. The share of firms making any capital expenditure is 8.1% (FY2024): more than nine in ten invest nothing.
Chapter 8 assumed for a solo business. The assumption agrees with the data on unincorporated businesses.
Remark 14.12 (What cannot be decided). Whether directors’ remuneration is a discretionary appropriation of profit or a return to labour cannot be decided here.
An observation supporting discretion: the directors’ remuneration ratio of the under-10m class stayed in the narrow band 7.6–9.1% throughout FY2015–FY2024, while over the same period ranged from to . Profit moves and remuneration does not.
But the labour-return account cannot be rejected either. Directors of small firms work in substance as employees, and it is equally possible that the remuneration is the return to that. Distinguishing the two needs remuneration per director and hours worked, but directors are not employees under the Labour Standards Act and no statistics on their hours exist. Both the Monthly Labour Survey and the Basic Survey on Wage Structure are confined to employees. This belongs to category (i), no measurement exists, of Section 13.2.
14.5.6 By industry (FY2024)
| Industry | (days) | ||
| Pure holding companies | 12 | 57.7% | 1710% |
| Water transport | 7 | 4.8% | 261% |
| Mining, quarrying and gravel extraction | 29 | 19.0% | 236% |
| Motor vehicles and parts | 9 | 5.1% | 201% |
| Leasing | 210 | 6.6% | 11.4% |
| Petroleum and coal products | 20 | 0.6% | 11.4% |
| Textiles | 78 | 2.0% | 9.2% |
| Fisheries | 40 | −1.5% | negative |
| Agriculture and forestry | 22 | −4.0% | negative |
Where the numerator is negative, , and by Proposition 5.5 free cash flow is negative even at zero growth.
A long and a small do not coincide (Table 14.13). Leasing has the longest at 210 days but a high , so on alone it sits at the same level as petroleum and coal products ( days, ). alone cannot decide the growth constraint. The including and is given in Section 14.5.
14.6 Right and exercise, and cognitive surplus
The of (2.15) is a measurable quantity, and measurements exist. Four are given below. What this text obtained itself, however, is only an upper bound; the value is unknown.
14.6.1 is measurable
This text’s measurement: family 2 recoveries on expiry.
The inequality holds because this figure also contains recoveries through refunds. What was obtained is an upper bound, not itself. The three examples below all give the value itself.
Gym memberships. [6] matched the contract choices and daily attendance records of 7,752 members across three US gyms, measuring the of (2.15) directly. Members predicted 9.50 visits a month and made 4.17. Members on plans above $70 a month attended on average only 4.3 times, paying more than $17 a visit where a ten-visit pass would cost $10. The loss over a membership averaged $600 against total payments of about $1,400, so is about 43% of the amount paid.
Subscription renewals. [9] covers a wider range. Using comprehensive data from a payment-card network, it exploits as an exogenous shock the fact that card renewal forces an active renewal decision. Across ten subscriptions, inattention raises sellers’ revenue by 89% on average (estimates ranging from 14% to over 200%). The attention parameter is estimated at 0.18 on average, ranging from 0.04 to 0.50 across services.
Breakage on prepaid balances. [13] treats family 2-4 (prepaid) directly. Analysing transaction data on over four million people for a scheme adding a bonus to prepaid restaurant balances, it records that about 40% of prepaid value goes unused. Operators earn a median of $5.50 of breakage profit per dollar of bonus, and the profit from breakage exceeds the revenue from increased spending.
Proposition 14.13 (Three conditions for measuring ). Estimating requires all three of the following simultaneously.
- (1)
- The contractual right : the tariff and any usage ceiling
- (2)
- Realized use : individual records for the same party; aggregates will not do
- (3)
- An exogenous event forcing attention: card renewal, a change of terms, a price revision
Grounds. Without (1) and (2) the difference cannot be defined. Without (3), observed continuation cannot be distinguished between “continued because it was worth it” and “continued through inattention”, and is not identified. [6] satisfies (1) and (2) through contract data and attendance records; [9] satisfies (3) through card renewal. □
This text’s family 2 measurement stopped at an upper bound because (2) and (3) were missing. Aggregate statistics contain no individual records and there is no exogenous shock. In the taxonomy of Section 13.2 this is not (i), no measurement exists, but (iv), access constraint: the method of measurement is established and what is needed is reaching the data.
14.6.2 A detour through the menu
Condition (2) of Proposition 14.13, individual realized use, is not available in published statistics. But a substitution of definitions can sometimes provide a detour.
When a flat rate and a per-use price coexist on the same menu, the break-even number of uses can be computed.
| (14.11) |
Even where is “unlimited” and unmeasurable, (14.11) follows from the menu alone. Using it as a proxy for , all that is needed is the industry-average number of uses .
Since (14.11) is equivalent to , substituting into (2.15) gives
| (14.12) |
Under this proxy, cognitive surplus is the difference between the flat fee and the per-use equivalent. The registered implication becomes the same claim as (14.12) being positive, that is, the flat fee exceeding the per-use equivalent of average use.
Registered implication: for flat-rate members, ; the average member does not reach break-even.
Result. From the Survey on Selected Service Industries, is 89 visits a year per individual member, that is 7.42 a month. was computed from the published prices of one large full-service operator (2026, tax included).
| Facility category | Unlimited plan | Per visit | ||
| I | 12,680 | 2,530 | 5.01 | −2.40 |
| II | 13,980 | 2,860 | 4.89 | −2.53 |
| III | 16,580 | 3,190 | 5.20 | −2.22 |
| IV | 19,080 | 3,630 | 5.26 | −2.16 |
The implication is rejected. The sign is negative in all four categories (Table 14.14): for the average member the flat contract is rational.
The effective unit price — total dues divided by total visits — points the same way, falling 29% over 25 years from 1,147 yen in 2000 to 815 yen in 2023. Against a per-visit market rate of 2,530–3,630 yen, members are using the facility more cheaply than paying per visit.
Remark 14.14 (When the detour applies). Equation (14.11) is uniquely determined only when the menu is a binary choice between flat and per-use. Actual tariffs are stepped: the operator above offers four visits a month, eight a month, and unlimited. The threshold then changes with the comparison chosen. Choosing the unlimited plan is rational at 5.0 visits a month against per-visit pricing, but requires 9.1–9.5 against the eight-visit plan. Average use of 7.42 is rational on the former and irrational on the latter.
The detour therefore applies only to binary menus; with a stepped menu the proxy for is not uniquely determined.
Remark 14.15 ( does not follow from this section). The rejection is a result about the mean. The findings of [6] concern the distribution, and a structure in which the lower tail loses is not excluded by a mean above break-even. Mean and distribution are different claims.
Remark 14.16 (What remains unmeasured within this framework). The prior work concentrates on subscriptions and memberships, that is, family 2-1 of Part II. No comparable estimates were found for family 2-4 (prepaid, gift cards) or family 2-5 (options and warranties). Nor was any study found estimating the share of within total across industries. What [9] measures is the increment to revenue, not a composition of profit.
The reason for purchase by medium serves as a proxy for the transaction frequency .
| Medium | For own use | As a gift | (days) |
| IC card | 95.5% | 0.0% | 15 |
| Server (online) | 78.1% | 14.0% | 17 |
| Paper | 41.5% | 30.1% | 845 |
The higher the gift share, the lower and the longer . The of (6.4) itself was not measured.
14.7 The information structure made concrete
The of Chapter 4 — verifiable shared information — is observable in family 5 as a concrete set of fields. The items published on the Employment Service Information Site are what consists of.
Symbol |
Instance |
Status |
|
separations within six months among those placed on open-ended contracts |
numeric, six years |
Breadth of |
the count of “separation not ascertained” (the smaller, the wider ) |
numeric; zero in all years for both observations |
(outcome-contingency) |
refund schemes |
presence is binary; rates and periods are not in a uniform format |
Proxy on the price side |
fee rates achieved by occupation |
continuous; 307 firms (Section 15.3.5.0) |
(noise in the outcome) |
baseline separation rates by occupation |
not measured |
Measured values of at the two establishments that could be confirmed:
Testing the of Example 4.5 requires both and as continuous quantities, but refund rates and periods are not in a uniform format and the uncontrollable part cannot be extracted from .
A test on the price side was possible, however. Fee rates achieved by occupation were obtained as a continuous quantity for 307 firms and correlated with separation rates (Section 15.3.5.0).
14.8 The three-way decomposition of surplus
The three components of (6.1) can be separated only in the case of Chapter 17.
| Component | Measured | Grounds |
| (price of function) | 20.0 points | within-platform comparison on Gumroad, differing only in whether customer acquisition is included |
| (rent from market power) | 15.0 points | the App Store’s two size tiers; function identical |
| (price of transfer and pooling) | — | for these two firms; positive where cases are screened individually |
| — | not measured in this domain |
This is the only case in which two of the three components could be separated numerically for a single transaction. No procedure for separating the components exists in the other domains.
The two firms are intermediaries operating at uniform rates published in a price list, so the risk component was negligible and separation was possible. Where an intermediary sets rates by individual screening, a third term is added and the separation fails (Remark 17.2).
14.9 The terms of the launch cost
For each term of (8.11), the price of externalization was measured, as the difference in effective rate on a $50 transaction.
| Term | Means of externalization | Price |
| payment processing | 3.6% | |
| (tax) | merchant of record | +1.4–2.4 points |
| (delivery) | a sales platform with hosting | +8–9 points |
| marketplace customer acquisition | +20 points | |
| self-funded through a free period | the cost of |
exceeds the sum of all the other items. itself (the development period) and the enumeration of cannot be externalized and therefore have no price.
14.10 Quantities relating to selection and identification
| Symbol | Measured | Source |
| (listed) | Section 12.9 |
|
| (mentioned) | of order | as above |
| (insolvency time) | not observed | outside the sample through conditioning on survival |
| not identified | Proposition A.7 |
|
| Upper bound on | 48,185 a year (published CVEs) | Chapter 9 |
| Effective | 245 a year (confirmed exploitation) | as above |
14.11 Quantities that could not be measured
The following are defined by the framework but could not be connected to real data (Table 14.20).
| Symbol | Name | Why it cannot be connected |
| cash balance | needs per-firm data; meaningless in aggregate |
|
| state space, filtration | not observable in principle |
|
| valuation map | subjective; the definition cannot be fixed |
|
| discount factor by party | requires experimental methods |
|
| capacity ceiling | differs by operator and is not disclosed |
|
| noise in the outcome | variance by occupation is not tabulated (Section 15.3.5.0) |
|
| decay rate of cognitive surplus | the numerator is itself unmeasured |
|
| cognitive surplus | only an upper bound here; the method is established (Section 14.6.1) |
|
| envisaged state space | exists only inside the designer |
|
| insolvency time | outside the sample through conditioning on survival (Proposition 4.7) |
|
|
|
is measurable in principle (Proposition 14.13); that this text could not reach it is a matter of data granularity. The rest belong to (i), no measurement exists, or are unobservable in principle.
Remark 14.17 (The framework is larger than what can be measured). About half the quantities defined could not be connected to real data. That is to say the framework describes the world more finely than the world is recorded, and it shows that precision of description and testability are independent. In the taxonomy of Section 13.2, most of what cannot be connected belongs to (i), no measurement exists, and effort does not resolve it.