English日本語|PDF (EN)PDF (JA)
v0.28.9 — This text is under construction. The structure of the theory, the propositions, and the empirical conclusions may all change. Overview

Part IV
Empirics

14 Measuring the Theoretical Quantities: What Could and Could Not Be Measured
14.1 Purpose of this chapter
14.2 The primitive sets made concrete
14.3 The observed range of the map Phi
14.4 Cumulants and the credit position
14.5 Measuring the growth constraint
14.6 Right and exercise, and cognitive surplus
14.7 The information structure G made concrete
14.8 The three-way decomposition of surplus
14.9 The terms of the launch cost
14.10 Quantities relating to selection and identification
14.11 Quantities that could not be measured
15 Empirics of families 2 and 5: prepayment and outcome-contingent forms
15.1 The propositions tested in this chapter
15.2 Family 2: prepaid payment instruments
15.3 Family 5: fee-charging employment placement
15.4 Comparison of the two families and its methodological implications
15.5 The structure of the data source
15.6 What was reached and what was abandoned
15.7 A quantity that is not tabulated: the credit position of sole proprietors
16 Evidence From the Corporate Statistics: kappa and CCC Across Firms
16.1 Position of this chapter
16.2 Hot and cold are not one-dimensional
16.3 Data source
16.4 Size and the direction of credit
16.5 Is CCC a leading indicator of the cycle?
16.6 An observation not anticipated: the long-run rise in CCC
16.7 Levels by industry (for reference)
16.8 Decomposing the rise in CCC
16.9 Separating the contemporaneous negative correlation
16.10 The effect of the scope of inventories on the conclusions
16.11 An observation the simplified capacity constraint does not fit
16.12 Limitations of this chapter
16.13 On both implications being rejected
17 The Price of Externalization: Platform Fees
17.1 The implication tested
17.2 Result: a ladder of rates
17.3 A natural experiment within one platform
17.4 A counterexample: price discrimination by size
17.5 Verdict
17.6 Practical implications
17.7 Limits of the measurement
17.8 How the institutional layer acts
17.9 Assessing feasibility of further investigation
17.10 Limits of this chapter
18 Evidence From Protocol Records: M(t) and the Rate of Modification
18.1 The implications tested
18.2 Results
18.3 Quantities measurable from the same records